A comparison of low carbon investment needs between China and Europe in stringent climate policy scenarios by Zhou, W. et al.
Environmental Research Letters
LETTER • OPEN ACCESS
A comparison of low carbon investment needs between China and
Europe in stringent climate policy scenarios
To cite this article: Wenji Zhou et al 2019 Environ. Res. Lett. 14 054017
 
View the article online for updates and enhancements.
This content was downloaded from IP address 147.125.57.176 on 23/07/2019 at 06:48
Environ. Res. Lett. 14 (2019) 054017 https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ab0dd8
LETTER
A comparison of low carbon investment needs between China and
Europe in stringent climate policy scenarios
Wenji Zhou1,6 , David LMcCollum1,2,6 , Oliver Fricko1,MatthewGidden1, DanielHuppmann1 ,
VolkerKrey1,3 andKeywanRiahi1,4,5
1 Energy Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Schlossplatz 1 - A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
2 University of Tennessee, 1640CumberlandAvenue, Knoxville, TN 37996,United States of America
3 Industrial Ecology and Energy Transitions Programmes, NorwegianUniversity of Science andTechnology (NTNU), NO-7491
Trondheim,Norway
4 GrazUniversity of Technology, Inffeldgasse, A-8010Graz, Austria
5 Colorado School ofMines, 1500 Illinois Street, Golden, CO80401,United States of America
6 Authors towhomany correspondence should be addressed.
E-mail: zhouw@iiasa.ac.at andmccollum@iiasa.ac.at
Keywords: low carbon investment, energy investment, paris agreement, integrated assessment
Supplementarymaterial for this article is available online
Abstract
The radical change in recent global climate governance calls for China and Europe to rampup their
efforts in leading theworld to reach the long-term climate goals. By analyzing the results from the
state-of-the-art global integrated assessmentmodel,MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM, this paper aims to
understand the future levels ofﬁnancial investment needed for building andmaintaining energy-
related infrastructure in the two regions for fulﬁlling stringent targets consistent with ‘well below
2 °C’. The results indicate that a rapid upscaling and structural change of these investments towards
decarbonization are necessitated by the climate stringent scenarios. China andEurope need to increase
their low carbon investments by 65%and 38% in a scenario reaching the 2° target relative to their
respective reference scenarios which assume no such target from2016–2050. In amore stringent
climate policy scenario of the 1.5° target, these investment needswill increase by 149%and 79% for
China and Europe respectively. Among all the energy sectors, energy efﬁciency, renewable electricity
generation and electricity transmission and distribution are the three largest investing targets for the
two regions. However, those investments will not likely be realizedwithout strong policy incentives.
Implications for greenﬁnance andmultilateral cooperation initiatives are discussed in the context of
the scenario results.
1. Introduction
The Paris Agreement deﬁnes the climate target aiming
at keeping a global temperature rise this century well
below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing
efforts to limit the temperature increase even further
to 1.5 °C [1]. Fulﬁlling these targets will require
pronounced reallocation of the investment portfolio
worldwide [2]. Total energy investment worldwide is
estimated to account for 2.2% of global gross domestic
product (GDP) and 10% of global gross capital
formation in 2016 [3]. China and Europe are the
world’s top two energy investmentmarkets. These two
regions are expected to ﬁll the leadership gap as the US
steps back from the commitment to implementing the
Paris Agreement. Examining investment needs of low
carbon sectors is therefore essential for decision
makers to enhance their cooperation in climate
actions, which is also requested by the most recent
G20 (Group of 20 countries) climate and energy action
plan for growth [4]. Moreover, comparison between
these two regions can illustrate to some extent how the
disparities between developing and developed coun-
tries impact future investment portfolio in the trans-
ition to a low-carbon world. In addition, this
comparative study can also provide necessary
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information for the ﬁnance communities in both the
regions which have become increasingly interested in
using scenario analysis in their strategic planning
processes [5].
There are remarkable disparities between China
and Europe with regards to energy supply and con-
sumption patterns, which in turn affects greatly their
investment landscapes. Coal still dominates in China’s
energy mix. But for Europe, oil and natural gas served
as top twomost important fuels. The share of low-car-
bon energy (renewables and nuclear) in China’s
energy mix is signiﬁcantly lower than that of Europe.
As the world’s largest market for energy investment,
China invested 357 billion dollars in 2016 into the
energy sector7, roughly 21% of the global total [3].
Europe ranked the third place with an investment
amount of 244 billion, or 15% of the worldwide total
in the same year [3]. The past several years have seen
signiﬁcant progress in decarbonization of both coun-
tries’ energy investments. The share of low carbon
energy investment (including renewables, nuclear and
energy efﬁciency) in total energy investment was 52%
for China and 59% for Europe, respectively, in 2016.
Supplementary material (SM) is available online at
stacks.iop.org/ERL/14/054017/mmedia provides
more details of primary energy and energy invest-
ments inChina and Europe at present.
Some previous studies provide analysis of these
investment needs under 2 degree futures [6–8], or
conduct cross-model comparisons on the global level
[2, 9]. It is estimated that in a ‘1.5 degree’ world,
investments in low-carbon energy technologies
(including energy efﬁciency) would need to approxi-
mately double in the next two decades, while invest-
ments in fossil-fuel extraction and conversion
decrease by about a quarter [10]. Regarding compar-
ison between China and Europe, some retrospective
studies trace the evolution of mutual investments in
the past decades [11], analyze the key drivers and bar-
riers behind the development trend [12], and assess
the impact of domestic policy priorities on bilateral
energy cooperation and climate policy [13]. None-
theless, a detailed prospective analysis is still absent in
estimating capital needs for the scenarios of the two
regions consistent with the Paris climate targets. This
kind of analysis should address some key issues, such
as the magnitudes of these investment needs corresp-
onding to different climate goals, the investment land-
scapes of diverse energy technologies, and how the
investment portfolio will shift to allow for the trans-
ition towards 2 °C or 1.5 °C pathways. To answer
these questions, this study attempts to perform quan-
titative assessment by employing the state-of-the-art
global integrated assessment model MESSAGEix-
GLOBIOM,which represents the newest generation of
MESSAGE combined with a reduced-form emulator
for GLOBIOM (hereafter we refer to this framework as
simplyMESSAGE).
2. Scenariomodelingmethodology
2.1.MESSAGEmodeling framework
Integrated assessment modeling (IAM) provides a
single platform for a comprehensive analysis of a
complex decision-making process that combinesmul-
tiple and diverse components, including the social,
economic and ecological implications of different
natural or anthropogenic factors [14]. It thus helps
deliver a systematic and transparent approach to
integration and has beenwidely used for climate policy
analysis. The energy core of IIASA’s IAM framework,
MESSAGE (Model for Energy Supply Strategy Alter-
natives and their General Environmental Impact) is a
linear programming energy-economy-environment-
engineering (4E) model with global coverage [15–17].
As a whole-systems optimization model, MESSAGE is
primarily used for medium- to long-term energy
system planning, energy policy analysis, and scenario
development. In addition, this version of MESSAGE
includes a reduced-form emulator for GLOBIOM (the
GLObal BIOsphere Model) to consistently assess the
implications of utilizing bioenergy of different types
and to integrate the GHG emissions from energy and
land use. This model is then linked to the aggregated
macro-economic model MACRO to assess economic
implications and to capture economic feedbacks.
The MESSAGE framework’s principal results
comprise, among others, estimates of technology-spe-
ciﬁc multi-sector response strategies for speciﬁc cli-
mate stabilization targets. By doing so, the model
identiﬁes the least-cost portfolio of mitigation tech-
nologies. The choice of the individual mitigation
options across regions, fuels and sectors is driven by
the relative economics of the abatement measures,
assuming full temporal and spatial ﬂexibility (i.e.
emissions-reduction measures are assumed to occur
when and where they are cheapest to implement). The
combined MESSAGE framework has global coverage
and divides the world into 11 regions. Detailed deﬁni-
tion of regions and key cost assumptions in this study
are provided in the SM.
2.2. Scenario deﬁnition
This study presents the initial results from four climate
policy scenarios consistent with the Shared Socio-
economic Pathway SSP2, a ‘middle-of-the-road’ nar-
rative for future socio-economic development,
technological change and challenges to mitigation and
adaptation [15, 18, 19] . Under the SSP2 Narrative,
four scenarios are explored. ‘Current Polices’ (CPol)
takes into account those energy- and climate-related
policies that were already implemented by countries as
of 2015, and serves as the reference case. The other
three mitigation scenarios are ‘Nationally Determined7Allmonetary units in this paper are expressed inUS$2015.
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Contributions’ (NDC), ‘Well Below 2 degrees’ (2 C)
and ‘Toward 1.5 degrees’ (1.5 C). Short descriptions of
these scenarios are listed in table 1, andmore informa-
tion can be found in [20] and [2].
2.3. Calculation of energy efﬁciency investments
Demand-side energy efﬁciency investments across the
end-use sectors (buildings, transport, industry) for
each scenario are calculated by utilizing amethodology
that was originally developed for the Global Energy
Assessment [21] and then adapted in the LIMITS
project [9]. We further reﬁne that methodology here.
The methodology makes use of two separate energy
efﬁciency components, as denoted in equations (1)–
(3). The ﬁrst component is the ‘Base-year efﬁciency’
investment. This is calculated by taking the level of
energy efﬁciency investments estimated by the Inter-
national Energy Agency [3] and then scaling those
efﬁciency investments with total ﬁnal energy demand
in the models’ scenarios (relative to 2015 ﬁnal energy
demand). The second is the ‘Supply-side offset’ comp-
onent, in which the ﬁnal energy demand in the
tightened policy scenarios (‘NDC’, ‘2 C’ and ‘1.5 C’) is
compared to that in the reference case (‘CPol’), it is
then assumed that, in equilibrium, the investments
made to reduce energy demand equal the investments
that are simultaneously offset on the supply side
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where IEE s t
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, , is the total investment of energy efﬁciency
in Scenario ‘s’, IEE s t
c
, ,
1 and IEE s t
c
, ,
2 are the ﬁrst and second
components in Scenario ‘s’ respectively. IEE,2015 is the
investment of energy efﬁciency in the base year of
2015. FEs t, is the ﬁnal energy consumption in Scenario
‘s’ in year ‘t’. FE2015 is the ﬁnal energy consumption in
the base year of 2015. IES s t, , is the supply-side invest-
ment in Scenario ‘s’ in year t. GDPs t, is the GDP in
Scenario ‘s’ in year ‘t’.
3. Results: future energy investments in
China andEurope
3.1. Total energy investment needs to 2050
To fulﬁll the longer-term climate targets consistent
with 2 °C and 1.5 °C, both China and Europe will
require a substantial change of their respective energy
investment landscapes going forward, both in terms of
total amount investment as well as structure. Figure 1
shows the average annual energy investment needs by
category inChina andEurope across the four scenarios
over the period between 2016–2050. The results show
no signiﬁcant difference between the ‘CPol’, which
depicts a continuation of current trends, and ‘NDC’,
reﬂecting the most recent energy and climate policy
pledges for all the regions. In the ‘CPol’ scenario, the
investment needs amount to 358 billion for China and
248 billion for Europe (39 billion for Eastern Europe
and 209 billion for Western Europe). These amounts
are quite close to the levels in 2016 for both China and
Europe, indicating that investments (in $) may not
necessarily scale with growing demands for energy
provision (in exajoule) in these markets, due to
technological and cost improvements in key energy
technologies. It is noteworthy that these results are
subject to a high degree of uncertainty. To illustrate
the uncertainty, we perform an across-model compar-
ison and calculate the total energy investments for
China and Europe from the results of six IAMs, which
span a range from least-cost optimization to compu-
table general equilibrium models, and from game
theoretic to recursive-dynamic simulation models.
Table 1.Brief descriptions of the policy scenarios depicted in this study.
Scenario Short description
Current policies (CPol) Considers high-impact energy- and climate-related policies implemented inG20 countries as
of 2015. Assumes these policies are included up to 2030, and equivalent effort in terms of
carbon emissions development for Post-2030.
Nationally determined contribu-
tions (NDC)
Assumes implementation of all countries’NDCs by 2030, (the target year ofmost), and equiva-
lent effort of carbon emissions development for Post-2030. This scenario represents a con-
tinuation of fragmented and highly diversiﬁed climate actionworldwide.
Well below 2 degrees (2 C) Consistent with the 2 degree target in the Paris Agreement (aims to hold themaximum increase
in global average temperatures to 2.0 °C). Stylized, globally and sectorally comprehensive
climatemitigation policies, in the form of carbon budgets, are included immediately after
2020 so as to limit carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuel and industrial operations
to approximately 1000GtCO2 over the 2011–2100 timeframe. Emissionsmitigation (after
2020) occurs where andwhen it ismost cost-effective.
Toward 1.5 degrees (1.5 C) Consistent with the 1.5 degree target in the Paris Agreement (aims to limit the increase in global
average temperatures to 1.5 °C). Stylized, globally and sectorally comprehensive climate
mitigation policies, in the formof carbon budgets, are included immediately after 2020 so as
to limit CO2 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial operations to approximately 400
GtCO2 over the 2011–2100 timeframe. Emissionsmitigation (after 2020) occurs where and
when it ismost cost-effective.
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The numeric results of the ranges across the models
are provided in the SM. This comparison hints at the
uncertainty to some extent, because IAMs are not a
homogenous group of tools, but use quite different
methodological approaches, parameter assumptions
and apply different system boundaries [2]. In addition,
key parameters such as cost estimates used by a single
model are also uncertain into the future, which will
signiﬁcantly impact the model results. We select 10
representative electricity generation technologies and
provide the cost assumptions on these technologies in
ourmodelingwork in the SM.
A remarkable increase of investments is required
as a result of the considerably more aggressive energy
and climate policy represented by the ‘2 C’ and ‘1.5 C’
pathways. In China’s case, the ‘2 C’ scenario requires
an increase of 23%, while the ‘1.5 C’ scenario requires
additional 59% investment, relative to the ‘CPol’ sce-
nario. This increase is relatively modest for Europe,
though there is major disparity existing inside Europe.
For Eastern Europe, extra 21% and 47% increase of
investment are required by the two stringent scenar-
ios, whereas for Western Europe with a cleaner energy
mix, this increase rate is narrowed to 18% and 38% for
‘2 C’ and ‘1.5 C’ respectively.
The structural change across the four scenarios is
characterized by a shift in the share of renewables and
fossil investments. China requires the largest increase
of investments into renewable electricity generation in
the more stringent scenarios. These investments in
‘2 C’ almost double from approximately 43 billion in
the ‘CPol’ scenario to 83 billion. And this number tri-
ples to 131 billion in ‘1.5 C’. Europe, as a whole, also
needs signiﬁcant incremental investments into this
category, although with a relatively moderate rate
compared to China. The amount of renewable invest-
ments increases by 40% from 27 billion in the ‘CPol’
baseline to 38 billion in the ‘2 C’ scenario, and to 54
billion in the ‘1.5 C’ scenario. Although not shown in
the ﬁgure, there is difference between the two regions
with regards to speciﬁc renewable technology invest-
ment. In China’s case, solar takes the largest portion of
renewable investment, closely followed by wind and
hydro, whereas the European case tends to use more
wind and relatively smaller shares of solar and hydro.
Besides, China also favors nuclear much more than
Europe in the low carbon scenarios.
The investments into fossil fuels, on the contrary,
would decline dramatically in the more stringent cli-
mate policy scenarios, particularly those investments
for the extraction and conversion sector. This is neces-
sitated by a transformation of the energy supply sys-
tem into the direction of decarbonization and
electriﬁcation. For China, the investments into fossil
fuel extraction and conversion decrease from 104 bil-
lion in the baseline to 68 billion in ‘2 C’, further drop-
ping to 47 billion for ‘1.5 C’. The European case show a
drop from 50 billion in the baseline to 39 billion in
‘2 C’ and further to 33 billion in ‘1.5 C’.
The trend of electriﬁcation also requires a large
amount of investments into the sector of electricity
transmission, distribution and storage. As such,
investments of this kind would also gain considerable
importance. China’s investments in this ﬁeld increases
from 84 billion in the baseline to 97 billion in ‘2 C’ and
further to 129 billion in ‘1.5 C’, while the European
case show an increase from 71 to 90 billion across the
scenarios. The investments into transmission, dis-
tribution and storage of electricity do not show a very
drastic increasing rate across scenarios when com-
pared to renewable energy and energy efﬁciency
investments. Nevertheless, the share of these invest-
ments in the total remains one of the largest both for
China and Europe across all the scenarios, indicating
the sustained opportunities for investors in this sector.
The changes of the investment landscape between
Eastern Europe and Western Europe move at similar
paces, e.g. the total energy investments of Western
Europe accounts for approximately 85% in the Eur-
opean total, and this share remains rather stable across
Figure 1.Annual average energy investments by category inChina and Europe from2016–2050.
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scenarios. However, some differences exist in the
breakdown categories. For Western Europe, the
investments into non-biomass renewable electricity
increase from 24 to 55 billion between the baseline and
‘1.5 C’ scenarios, relatively higher than the case of
Eastern Europe.
3.2. Low carbon investment pathways
In this study, we deﬁne low carbon investments as
those going to renewable electricity, bioenergy,
nuclear, CCS, energy efﬁciency and the portion of
electricity T&D and storage corresponding to low
carbon electricity consumption. By this deﬁnition, low
carbon investments in 2016 were 185 billion for China
and 145 billion for Europe, or 52% and 59% in their
respective total energy investments. These shares were
much higher than the world average level, which was
approximately 34%, indicating that China and Europe
are already leading the way toward a lower carbon
future. Yet, more needs to be done going forward if the
countries are to put themselves on a path consistent
with 2 °C and 1.5 °C. Figure 2 shows the relationship
between annual CO2 emissions and low carbon
investments across scenarios from2020–2050.
In China’s case, CO2 emissions of the baseline and
‘NDC’ scenarios reach as high as 9100 million tons at
some point between 2020–2050. The growth of emis-
sions results from a slight reduction of the scale of low
carbon investments. On the contrary, the ‘2 C’ and
‘1.5 C’ scenarios are characterized by persistent
increase of low carbon investments and consequently
deep reduction of CO2 emissions. Over this period, the
annual average CO2 emissions of ‘2 C’ drop by 32%,
and the low carbon investments increase by 59%. In
the ‘1.5 C’ scenario, the emissions are reduced by
nearly half, in correspondence with an increase of low
carbon investments to 2.4-fold from 174 to 415
billion.
For Europe, the current policies indicate relatively
stable levels of both emissions and low carbon invest-
ments. Whereas the 2 C and 1.5 C scenarios also
necessitate marked rise from the current investment
levels to 161 and 179 billion to 2030, further increase
to 211 and 272 billion to 2050, or by 31% and 69%
relative to the level in 2020.
The story between Eastern and Western Europe is
different in some aspects. In both the scenarios of ‘2 C’
and ‘1.5 C’, most of the low carbon investments still
happen in the west, with a share of approximately 85%
over time. The increase of these investments over this
period is quite close between the east and the west,
however, the consequent reduction of CO2 emissions
differs to some extent. For Eastern Europe, the CO2
emissions are reduced by 33% in ‘2 C’ and by 57% in
‘1.5 C’, whileWestern Europe reduces its emissions by
19% and 41% in the same scenarios. These results
indicate that a relatively smaller marginal cost for
reducing emissions in the east than in the west, parti-
cularly inmore stringent climate scenarios.
For both China and Europe, maintaining the cur-
rent scales of low carbon investments to 2030 would
lead to fulﬁllment of their NDC targets and evenmore.
A small addition of 10% increase from current low
carbon investments can keep their efforts consistent
with the 2 C target in the short-term future before
2030. Nevertheless, further promotion of these scales
is still required afterwards in the mid-term or long-
term future, especially under the more stringent 1.5 C
target.
Figure 2.Annual average CO2 emissions and low carbon investments inChina and EU from2020–2050. Arrows give an indication of
the time dimension, from2015–2050.
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3.3. Electricity generation sector
A high-degree of electriﬁcation is widely considered as
an important characteristic of the energy system
transformation. This necessitates decarbonizing the
electricity generation sector to reduce the CO2 emis-
sions of the whole energy system from the life cycle
perspective. For instance, China and some European
countries have announced the timetable to halt
production of petrol cars by around 2030–2040.
Nevertheless, some studies argue that the life cycle
CO2 emissions of current electric cars are not necessa-
rily lower than those of conventional petrol cars,
which depend on the power generation mix [22]. As
such, we zoom in to the mix of investments and the
breakdown technologies of electricity production over
the period between 2020–2030. Figure 3 shows these
results of each scenario for China andEurope.
A clear message from these results is that the trend
of renewables dominating the power generation
investments continues across all the scenarios for both
regions. However, signiﬁcant differences still exist
inside the composition. For China, coal still accounts
for as high as 30% in the total investments into elec-
tricity generation under the ‘CPol’ and ‘NDC’ scenar-
ios. This share for Europe is negligible, but oil and gas
together take a similar share of 25%. Among all the
non-fossil fuels, hydro is the most favored investment
type in China’s electricity sector, whereas wind takes
the largest part in the European case.
The structural change of power generation invest-
ments is greater for China than for Europe across the
four scenarios. The European mix shows that the allo-
cation of the investments into each fuel type remains
relatively stable from the ‘CPol’ scenario to the
stringent scenarios, despite of the considerable
increase in terms of the absolute amount. Never-
theless, one can still see thewaning of fossil-based elec-
tricity in the investment pie to some extent. By
contrast, a much greater shrinkage of this share can be
observed in China’s case, and a drastic surge of solar
investment occurs in the ‘1.5 C’ scenario. To reach this
most stringent target, Europe might also need to
increase the share of nuclear investments to 5%, and
the share of CCS to 4%, though these shares are negli-
gible under the ‘CPol’ and ‘NDC’ scenarios.
3.4. Contribution toGDP
Investment constitutes an important part of economic
growth. China’s economy is widely viewed to highly
depend on investment. Nevertheless, it has been
undergoing a revolutionary structural transition
towards a more consumption-driven direction in the
most recent years. In developed economies such as
Western Europe, the contribution of investment to
economic growth is much lower than that of develop-
ing countries and economies in transition, including
both China and Eastern Europe. This is also reﬂected
by the contributions of the total energy investments to
GDP, as shown by the solid lines of ﬁgure 4. Before
2030, the contribution is larger for China and Eastern
Europe than Western Europe. As the former two
economies continue growing at relatively higher rates,
the energy investment shares inGDPdecline rapidly in
the baseline. The low carbon scenarios, however,
feature higher shares of energy investments in the
whole economic growth for all the regions. In 2050,
total energy investments make up 0.94% and 1.06% in
China’s ‘2 C’ and ‘1.5 C’ cases. This share is even
Figure 3. Shares of different fuels in power generation investments in 2030.
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slightly higher for both Western and Eastern Europe,
between which the former has 1.10% and 1.33% in
‘2 C’, and the latter has 1.16% and 1.24% of GDP
coming from energy investments in the same
scenarios.
It is obvious that the higher contribution of energy
investments to GDP in the mitigation scenarios is the
result of enhancing low carbon investments, which is
demonstrated by the dashed lines in ﬁgure 4. Although
the trends of these shares are still declining for China
and Eastern Europe, the decline rates are signiﬁcantly
slower than those of total energy investments. In 2050,
China’s low carbon investments contribute 0.63% and
0.77% to its economy in the ‘2 C’ and ‘1.5 C’ scenarios,
which are 70% and 108% higher than the baseline
case. This promotion of contribution forWestern and
Eastern Europe is even more signiﬁcant. This contrib-
ution in the ‘2 C’ scenario almost doubles from the
baseline for both the two regions, while in ‘1.5 C’, the
contribution increases to 2.6 fold for the west and 2.4
fold for the east. On the other hand, high energy costs
induce long-term reductions in consumption and
then exert negative impacts on economic develop-
ment. Periods of high or suddenly increasing energy
expenditure levels are associated with low economic
growth rates [23]. Priority of energy efﬁciency has
been reﬂected in energy development strategies in
both China and Europe. These facts highlight the
necessity of investments into energy efﬁciency tech-
nologies, in combination of other measures, to lower
down the costs on the supply side, to minimize energy
expenditures without hindering economic
development.
4.Discussion andpolicy implications
By applying the state-of-the art IAM, this study
performs quantitative assessment on low-carbon
investment needs for China and Europe in line with
the global climate targetsmade by the Paris agreement.
The assessment reveals that despite the two regions are
increasing investments into low-carbon sectors, the
gaps are still large to keep their efforts on trackwith the
global climate targets. Three sectors, namely, energy
efﬁciency, renewable electricity generation and elec-
tricity transmission and distribution are identiﬁed as
the key areas of investment. In the ‘2 C’ scenario, the
share of these investments in the total energy invest-
ments is 69% for China and 72% for Europe. While in
the ‘1.5’ scenario, this share increases to 77% forChina
and 74% for Europe. This model-based comparative
assessment complements the existing literature
focused on retrospective comparison [11, 13] or
qualitative analysis [24, 25]. In addition, these results
are also informative for the ﬁnance community which
has become increasingly interested in using scenario
analysis in their strategic planning processes [5]. Below
we extend our discussion to policy implications
particularly in greenﬁnance.
4.1. Challenges tomeet the investment gap
Some characteristics of low carbon technologies also
bring challenges in ﬁnancing those investments. Many
of these technologies have higher upfront costs and are
more dependent on long-term ﬁnance than traditional
investments in the same sectors [26]. In the model
assumptions, the capital cost of solar power is
approximately 2–3 times higher than that of conven-
tional coal power plant in China and Europe. Relevant
policies exert huge inﬂuences on some aspects such as
the general investment environment, the types of
investors involved and the structure and timing of
their investments, etc Some other critical issues have
been emerging along with the elevation of low carbon
investments in recent years, e.g. increasingly severe
curtailment of renewable electricity in China [27], and
a growing number of lawsuits from low carbon energy
Figure 4.Contributions of total energy investments (solid lines) and low carbon investments (dashed lines) toGDP.
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investors in some European countries due to policy
instability. In addition, the transition itself might
increase the risks of ‘stranded’ assets. The results from
a group of IAMs show that on average, 60 percent of
coal power plants without CCS have to become
stranded assets by 2030 for the world to stay on track
for the 2 C scenario [28]. A part of these assets would
occur as a result of an already ongoing technological
trajectory, irrespective of whether or not new climate
policies are adopted [29]. Such risks may not only lead
to economic losses and unemployment, but could also
affect the market valuation of the companies that own
these assets, thus negatively impacting their investors
[25, 30]. And should China and European countries
adopt stringent new climate policies to reach the 2 °C
target of the Paris Agreement, then the negative
impacts on the fossil fuel sector could be ampliﬁed
[29]. Therefore, to maintain a sustainable investment
ﬂow, these issues need to be addressed by taking into
account many different factors such as energy supply
structure, energy end-use characteristics, and ﬁnancial
environment, etc.
4.2. Towards low carbon and greenﬁnance
The concept of green ﬁnance or sustainable ﬁnance is
gaining increasing attention in both China and the
European countries. In 2016, G20 leaders recognized
the need to ‘scale up green ﬁnance’ for the ﬁrst time,
setting out a series of steps to make this happen [31].
On a conceptual level, green ﬁnance can be under-
stood as ﬁnancing of investments that provide envir-
onmental beneﬁts in the broader context of
environmentally sustainable development [32]. The
associated instruments include green loans, green
bonds, green investment trusts and funds as well as
green indices and ETFs (exchange-traded funds)
etc [31].
Therefore mobilising the additional investments
depends on the ﬁnancing from other channels, such as
the promotion of current green ﬁnance systems [33].
In particular, to meet stringent climate goals, much
larger amounts of investments need to be mobilised
from private sectors such as institutional investors,
notably pension funds, insurance companies, sover-
eignwealth funds andmutual funds [34]. A good prac-
tice is green investment banks that some countries
have established, e.g. the Green Investment Bank (now
Green Investment Group) launched by the UK gov-
ernment in 2012 and viewed as the ﬁrst institution of
its type in theworld, which has created one of Europe’s
largest teams of dedicated green infrastructure inves-
tors [35]. Another example is Switzerland’s Technol-
ogy Fund, which focuses on scaling up innovative
environmental and low-carbon technologies that face
a deployment gap [36]. The Chinese government has
also proposed to establish a series of national and
regional green funds of public–private partnership
[37]. These entities have been capitalized by using a
variety of funding sources including: government
appropriations and programmes (including realloca-
tion of funds from existing programmes); revenue
from carbon taxes, emissions trading schemes, renew-
able portfolio standards and energy efﬁciency resource
standards; utility bill charges; and bond issuance [38].
4.3. Cooperation betweenChina andEurope in
energy and climate change
China and Europe are strengthening bilateral coopera-
tion in climate change and aiming to ﬁll the leadership
gap as the US steps back from the commitment to
implementing the Paris Agreement. The jointly pub-
lished ‘China-EU Roadmap on energy cooperation
(2016–2020)’ in 2015 ensures that energy cooperation
makes a key contribution to the comprehensive
strategic partnership between China and the EU [39].
Some areas for cooperation include the circular
economy, clean energy, climate change and invest-
ment [40]. Strengthening this cooperation can be done
via the followingmeans:
4.3.1. Strengthen multilateral communications in
capacity building
Exchange of information and experiences among
countries in improving their ﬁnancial system in this
ﬁeldwould greatly facilitate the ﬁnancing process. And
spreading knowledge of the commercial viability of
low carbon technologies and policies on low carbon
investment among stakeholders will alleviate risk
aversion towards projects in low carbon energy
technologies [24].
4.3.2. Promote cross-border capital ﬂow in the ﬁeld of low
carbon energy investment
Increasing cross-border capital ﬂow for low carbon
energy investment would not only broaden the
ﬁnancial sources, but also accelerate diffusion of new
technologies. Since the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–10, the
global cross-border capital ﬂow—in all economic
sectors—has been undergoing deep decline, as a result
of a variety of factors, e.g. a collapse in cross-border
bank lending, primarily by European banks [41]. In
addition, to lift the barriers that restrict the investment
capital ﬂow, dedicated policy measures, such as
simplifying approval processes for green bond issuers,
providing guidance on reporting and disclosure, and
providing clearer policy guidance on market-entering
schemes [42], would also bring signiﬁcant beneﬁts.
5. Conclusions
This study presents the analysis of energy investment
needs for China and Europe under baseline scenarios
as well as pathways in line with the global climate
targets made by the Paris agreement (‘well below
2 °C’). The results show that signiﬁcant change of
energy investments for the two regions is necessary to
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reach the stringent targets in two dimensions: one is
the incremental amount of investment in absolute
terms, and the other is critical decarbonization of
investment structure. The challenges in the medium-
term future are greater than that of near-term.
Maintaining the current level of low carbon invest-
ment would fulﬁll the NDC pledges of China and
Europe to 2030, while an increase of 10% investment
would keep the efforts consistent with those required
by the 2 °C target during the same period. Pursuing
the 1.5 °C target would, however, require a consider-
ably stepped-up investment effort by 2030. Energy
efﬁciency, low carbon electricity generation and elec-
tricity transmission and storage are the three most
important sectors of investment to meet the goals.
Marginal cost for emissions reduction differs among
regions. Our results show that themarginal abatement
cost for China is roughly 30% lower than that of
Europe to 2050 in the ‘2 C’ scenario, whereas under
the most stringent ‘1.5 C’ target, this gap decreases to
only 8%.
The scenario results presented here indicate that
signiﬁcant investment opportunities exist in both
China and Europe. These opportunities will be never
realized, however, without strong policy incentives.
Low carbon investments are characterized of higher
upfront costs and more dependence on long-term
ﬁnance than traditional fossil energy investments. The
policies aimed at enhancing low carbon investments
shall be carefully designed to facilitate the imple-
mentation processes. It is still challenging to incorpo-
rate long-term climate beneﬁts into short-term
evaluation on the performance of investment portfo-
lio, which usually draws more interest from the
ﬁnance sector. Discussions on the countermeasures
will be important for both researchers and policy-
makers. Well-designed climate policies will create
many of the favorable conditions necessary to stimu-
late low carbon investments. Yet, more general eco-
nomic policies can also be helpful in the low carbon
energy sector, such as broadening channels of private
investment into low-carbon projects, promoting
cross-border capital ﬂow in the ﬁeld of low carbon
energy investment, increasing ﬂexibility of electricity
network cross borders and strengthening multilateral
communications in capacity building.
Due to many factors such as parameter settings
and socio-economic assumptions in the modeling fra-
mework, there is considerable uncertainty with regard
to the results discussed in this paper, as well as their
interpretation [2, 9]. In future work, it would be
important to go beyond the current analysis and
explore the co-beneﬁts of low carbon investments and
the relation of these investments to broader sustain-
able development goals (e.g. air pollution, water avail-
ability, etc).
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